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
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⑥ EVALUATION PLAN:
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78

⑪ 23 October 1978

⑫ 92%



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JB

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I. INTRODUCTION

The mobilization and deployment capability of the United States is an important element of national defense. An exercise known as Nifty Nugget 78 is being conducted in order to assess national capabilities to mobilize and deploy forces in time of crisis. During this exercise the roles and capabilities of elements of the National Command Authority, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Military Departments and Services, and other Federal organizations will be evaluated. Of particular concern and importance in this exercise is the ability of OSD to contribute effectively to the decision process during mobilization, and therefore special emphasis is being given in Nifty Nugget to the OSD role. In order to perform effectively, the OSD must interact successfully with a wide variety of other organizations both within and outside the DoD; therefore, the interfaces between OSD and other organizations will also be evaluated. This plan outlines the manner in which the OSD evaluation will be conducted.

One way of analyzing the mobilization process is to break it down into five major resource-oriented areas:

- (1) Military manpower mobilization,
- (2) Selection of the force structure to be deployed,
- (3) Civilian manpower mobilization,
- (4) Transportation mobilization, and
- (5) Maintenance, supply, and industrial mobilization.

Military manpower mobilization is generally concerned with providing, in a timely manner, adequately trained and equipped military personnel from manpower resources ranging from highly-trained people on active duty to civilians

of military service age with no prior military experience. Selecting the force structure is an involved process of recommendation, review, and decision steps inevitably resting on both military and political judgment factors. Civilian manpower mobilization is concerned with acquiring enough civilians in the requisite skills to support the Department of Defense, the industrial base and other vital national concerns as the mobilization process increases the need for management, technical and support people. Transportation mobilization includes the mobilization and unified operation of the various modes of transportation (rail, airlift, and sealift) needed to support the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies while at the same time avoiding serious disruption of the civilian economies of the U. S. and its allies. Maintenance, supply and industrial mobilization similarly involves the determination of wartime requirements, the capabilities of the Military Departments to meet those requirements from resources under their control in peacetime and the ability of the industrial base to make up shortfalls in a timely manner.

As the OSD plays its key role in the mobilization and deployment process, these five areas will be affected by OSD's policies, plans, and procedures. The Nifty Nugget exercise should provide an opportunity to observe the effects of these policies, plans, and procedures.

Nifty Nugget 78 is a joint mobilization exercise, directed by the Secretary of Defense, which postulates a conventional war in Europe. The exercise will last from 10 October through 30 October 1978, although some elements will continue the exercise for nine additional days. Nifty Nugget is a command post exercise, and thus there will be no live unit mobilizations or deployments; however, the Army will move representatives from some of its larger reserve component units to ten mobilization stations. Federal and

civilian agencies will participate in a parallel exercise (REX 78) to test their abilities to support full mobilization.

The objectives of the evaluation described in this plan is to improve the OSD contribution to mobilization by selectively observing and evaluating certain critical parts of Nifty Nugget. The results of the evaluation will be a report containing specific recommendations for improvements in authorities, policies, and procedures; and identifying areas requiring further evaluation and study.

The next section of this plan describes the technical approach for this evaluation, and the third section discusses the tasks, schedule and resources involved. Appendix A contains examples of the types of issues that will be developed as a result of the evaluation, and Appendix B contains potential questions that may be inserted into the exercise.

II. TECHNICAL APPROACH

The general approach to the evaluation of OSD's capability to support the mobilization and deployment process is to state a number of tentative conclusions or hypotheses which will serve as points of departure for observation and analysis by the OSD evaluation team. Each tentative conclusion is supported by a number of examples of suspected problems which, if verified during the Nifty Nugget exercise, will in turn validate the tentative conclusion. This approach has been chosen because the evaluation team consists of people who have extensive backgrounds in Defense management, in military operations and support, and in large-scale systems analysis. The team also has special insights into the problems associated with mobilization and deployment and therefore is capable of defining specific problem areas early in the evaluation.

Hypotheses have been identified with respect to three key aspects of OSD policies, plans and procedures that seem to cut across the five mobilization and deployment areas. These aspects are:

- Adequacy of Command and Control for OSD
- Adequacy of Command and Control for DoD and other agencies
- Adequacy of resources to support mobilization.

The command and control structure includes: the information which the decision makers and their assistants need for the review and decision process; an organization with unambiguous authority and responsibility relationships and a structure for making decisions; and a system for providing notification and coordination once a decision is made.

Table 1 identifies the tentative conclusions and issues which will serve as the point of departure for observation and analysis. Table 2 cross-references these issues to the five mobilization and deployment areas. Some of these issues are discussed at greater length in Appendix A.

As the exercise proceeds, the evaluation team will observe key actions and decisions, and will formulate impressions, observations, and questions regarding the hypotheses. The team will insert questions into the exercise to further probe the hypotheses and will begin to develop judgments regarding recommendations for improvement. The team will visit key organizations and will conduct interviews with selected exercise participants.

As the exercise concludes, the team will have identified the specific issues that were confirmed during the exercise, and will develop the details of a final report. The team will review the records of the exercise to pin down details, attend debriefings, interview key people to elicit their reflections on the issues, and generally refine and sharpen the logic of the report and its conclusions.

The final report will crystallize the issues, highlighting exercise play that confirms them, and will include substantive recommendations for improvement.

TABLE 1. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND ISSUES

1. Command and Control Structure for OSD. A command and control structure adequate to support a responsive mobilization and deployment review and decision process does not seem to exist within OSD. Examples of suspected weaknesses:

- Issue 1A: Limited overall capability in OSD to properly direct and coordinate staff activities in time of crisis.
- Issue 1B: Lack of a responsive mechanism for reaching decision in the allocation of the 50,000 reserve callup.
- Issue 1C: Lack of a responsive mechanism for approving the force structure to be deployed.
- Issue 1D: Lack of a responsive mechanism for securing approval to extend terms of service and to change military orders.
- Issue 1E: Lack of synthesized, useful knowledge in OSD regarding the laws, rules, regulations and other authorities governing the various aspects of mobilization.

2. Command and Control for DoD and Other Agencies: A command and control structure involving DoD and other federal agencies and adequate to support mobilization and deployment apparently does not exist. Examples of suspected weaknesses:

- Issue 2A: Lack of a proven system for mobilizing and organizing sea, rail, automotive and air transport.
- Issue 2B: Lack of an adequate information system concerning key readiness and production data for munitions, weapons, and supplies.
- Issue 2C: Unclear authority and responsibility relationships for mobilization among OSD, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and other federal organizations.

3. Resources: Resources to support mobilization and deployment are apparently inadequate in certain critical areas. Examples of suspected weaknesses:

- Issue 3A: Inadequate sea, rail, automotive, and air transportation.
- Issue 3B: Inadequate out-load and reception facilities at key posts, bases and ports.
- Issue 3C: Inadequate munition production and assembly facilities to support rapid mobilization and deployment.
- Issue 3D: Manpower shortfalls.
- Issue 3E: Equipment shortfalls in POMCUS and other prepositioned stocks.
- Issue 3F: Lack of sufficient medical personnel, supplies, and facilities to meet military and civilian needs.
- Issue 3G: Deficiencies or imbalances in military combat and support force structures.

TABLE 2. MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES AND AREAS

<u>Mobilization and Deployment Areas</u>					
<u>Tentative Issues</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u>	<u>Force Structure Selection</u>	<u>Civilian Manpower</u>	<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Maintenance, Supply, and Industrial Support</u>
1. OSD Command & Control					
A. Direction & Coordination	X	X	X	X	X
B. Reserve Callup Allocation	X	X			
C. Force Structure Selection		X			
D. Military Order Changes	X				
E. Knowledge of Laws, Rules, Regulations	X	X	X	X	X
2. DoD & Other Agency Command & Control					
A. Transportation Mobilization				X	
B. Information on War Production				X	X
C. Authorities of FEMA and Other Agencies			X	X	X
3. Inadequate Resources					
A. Transportation				X	
B. Out-Load & Reception				X	
C. Munition Production					X
D. Manpower	X				
E. POMCUS and War Reserves					X
F. Medical Support	X	X	X		X
G. Force Structure Deficiencies	X	X	X	X	

III. TASKS, SCHEDULES AND RESOURCES

The evaluation of the OSD contribution to mobilization will be conducted by a team consisting of four senior people supported by three experienced analysts. The team will address the issues described in Section II and may develop additional issues as a result of their observations during and after the exercise. The issues have already been outlined, and in some cases issue papers have been prepared in preliminary form. For each of the issues, the analysts will prepare background information to assist the evaluation team.

Team members and analysts will visit agencies and units participating in the exercise. By observing the exercise play and talking to key individuals, the team will attempt to determine where policy, plans and procedures might be improved in order to improve mobilization and deployment capabilities. The events preceding and following the mobilization decision will also be carefully reviewed. In some cases it will be necessary to conduct interviews after the exercise takes place. This is simply because the participants may be too busy or too involved to properly reflect on the results of the exercise while the exercise is still underway.

Upon completion of Nifty Nugget and the subsequent interviews, team members will prepare an evaluation report based upon their field notes and observations. The report will be prepared in two stages. The first stage will be completed by November 30, 1978 in time for presentation of the evaluation at a mobilization seminar scheduled for early December. The final report will be prepared by January 20, 1979. Table 3 lists the tasks and milestones associated with this evaluation.

TABLE 3. MILESTONES ASSOCIATED WITH THE OSD MOBILIZATION EVALUATION

	<u>Oct.</u>	<u>Nov.</u>	<u>Dec.</u>	<u>Jan.</u>
1. Conduct Field Evaluations of the Exercise	20 ▲	10 ▲		
2. Conduct Additional Interviews	20 ▲		20 ▲	
3. Prepare and Revise Issue Papers	20 ▲	30 ▲	30 ▲	
4. Prepare Preliminary Evaluation Report & Seminar Paper		30 ▲	30 ▲	
5. Prepare Final Evaluation Report & Briefing			30 ▲	20 ▲

Listed below are the organizations and individuals to be interviewed during and after Nifty Nugget:

1. Office of the Secretary of Defense - Selected key individuals from the following offices: Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics; Program Analysis and Evaluation; General Counsel; Legislative Affairs; International Security Affairs; Comptroller; and Health Affairs. Other people to be interviewed include those individuals who acted as the Secretary of Defense and his principal assistants as well as the regular participants of the OSD Emergency Coordination Group (ECG) and the people who regularly supported the ECG.
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff - Individuals playing the role of Chairman and senior supporting officers (such as the Director, the J-3, the J-4, and the J-5;) the JCS controllers; key members of the Operations Planning Group.

3. Military Departments and Services - Key participating members of the Service Secretariats; Chief and Vice Chief of the Army, as well as individuals who acted out these positions for the Army and the other Services; controllers; selected members of the Service headquarters staffs including the Ops Deps.
4. Unified Commands - CINCs and selected key participants from the following commands: REDCOM, LANTCOM, MTMC, MAC, as well as AFRED and ARRED.
5. Defense Agencies - Key representatives from Defense Logistics Agency and possibly other agencies.
6. Other Federal Organizations - Key representatives from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Selective Service System, and possibly also the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Transportation.

In certain instances it may not be possible to meet with all of the individuals in the list above. However, it is expected that the great majority of interviews will take place either during or shortly after the exercise. By developing the issues early and through sequential interviews, it will be possible to test the conclusions associated with each issue in a variety of ways. The tests will occur at several different points in time (during and after the exercise) but will also occur at several different levels in the organization ranging from the most senior individuals to key staff members.

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE ISSUE OUTLINES

2A Transportation Mobilization

3D Active and Reserve Unit Manpower

2A TRANSPORTATION MOBILIZATION

Issue: There apparently is not a proven system for mobilizing, allocating, and integrating sea, rail, automotive and air transportation.

Discussion: The problem of mobilizing transportation assets is complicated by the large number of organizations involved in the subject. The key military organizations include the Military Terminal and Management Command (MTMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC). There are also federal agencies involved outside of DoD (e.g., Department of Transportation) as well as the commercial carriers. Good information is lacking concerning such basic issues as the availability of railway cars for transporting Army equipment and the availability of port facilities. In addition, there is no simple way of determining the impact of the utilization of commercial facilities on the economy. For example, the effect on the economy of activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is not known.

NN Play: The availability of equipment will be partially tested in Nifty Nugget. However, it is unlikely that inter-organizational relationships will be realistically tested.

Evaluation:

A. Command and Control Structure

1. Information. Is there an adequate system for obtaining information concerning the transportation needs such as: departure times, destinations, weights, volumes, etc. for military

personnel and equipment. Is there adequate information concerning the resources and time necessary to transport people and equipment? Is there adequate information concerning the impact on the economy of allocating civilian transport to military needs?

2. Organization. Are the authorities and responsibilities of the various organizations involved clearly delineated?
3. Notification and Coordination. Is there an adequate system for notifying all the agencies and commercial industries involved?

B. Resources.

1. Are there adequate resources to meet transportation needs while at the same time serving vital domestic needs?
2. Is there a mechanism to assess the resource tradeoffs in various transportation mode mixes?

3D ACTIVE AND RESERVE UNIT MANPOWER

Issue: There will likely be manpower shortfalls in active and reserve units during a mobilization. It is not clear how additional trained manpower will be acquired to meet mobilization.

Discussion: From a military mobilization standpoint, the available manpower supply pool consists of people in the following categories:

- On active duty with unexpired terms of obligated service.
- On active duty but about to complete their active duty obligation.
- In reserve units with unexpired terms of obligated service.
- In reserve units but about to complete their reserve duty obligation.
- In the Individual Ready Reserve with a residual military obligation and subject to involuntary call to active duty.
- In the Individual Ready Reserve with no further military obligation.
- In neither the active nor reserve forces but with prior military experience and no further military obligation.
- Active duty retirees.
- Reserve retirees.
- Of draft age with no prior military experience.

Each of these categories of people is important in a major mobilization. Each is governed, for mobilization purposes, by a separate set of laws, authorities, rules and regulations. The mobilization process requires hundreds of decisions involving these basic categories and many subcategories.

These decisions must be executed in such a way that:

- trained manpower is supplied to the active forces (including mobilized reserve units) in a smooth and timely fashion.
- treatment given each category is perceived as fair and non-discriminatory.

The interdependencies among these requirements impose an extremely complex ordering of the individual decisions. There are several thresholds of national crisis or emergency, each with its own set of Presidential authorities. It will not be completely clear in all cases as to what the President's unilateral authorities really are. In some cases he can move independently; in other cases he must notify Congress. In some instances he can act with Congressional resolution; and in others he can act only after legislation. Adequate legislation can take time if there is doubt about the importance of, or appropriate U.S. reaction to, the developing crisis. Failure to obtain legislation to permit the President to take certain actions could, in the interest of fairness, also inhibit him from taking actions where he does have unilateral authority. An example of this would be gaining the authority to induct people who have had no prior military service versus the authority to extend terms of enlistments. The latter action, although a presidential prerogative, could be considered unfair if taken by itself.

Because there will be differences among the qualifications of each personnel category, each will require different treatment in personnel processing, testing, medical exams, training, transportation, and assignment.

There are many areas associated with this issue which require detailed review by several OSD offices.

NN Play: It is assumed that the President initiates the call-up on 12 October. Plans for which resources will be tapped will be executed thereafter.

Evaluation:

A. Command and Control Structure

1. Information. Is there adequate information concerning the number, skill level, physical condition, training level, and other qualifications for the people in each military mobilization category, particularly those not on active duty? Is there adequate information concerning the resources and time necessary to transform the people of each category into the requisite types and numbers of trained military personnel. For each of the deficiencies that are identified, what changes should be made to policies, plans and procedures in order to provide adequate information?
2. Organization. Are the authorities and responsibilities of the President, Secretary of Defense, JCS and Services clearly defined? Are they clearly documented? What new legislative initiatives are necessary? Are there overlaps (and underlaps) between the OSD, JCS, the Services, and other agencies?
3. Notification and coordination. Is there an adequate system for communicating Secretary of Defense, JCS and Service call-up decisions to DoD and DoD related units (e.g., reserve units)? Is there a procedure for locating the people in each mobilization category? Is there a procedure for coordinating with state and local governments?

B. Resources

1. Are there adequate resources for screening of information regarding people in each category, personnel administration, testing and training?

2. Is there adequate medical support?
3. Is the transportation adequate?
4. Is there enough equipment?
5. How is this effort funded?

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE QUESTIONS TO BE INSERTED INTO THE EXERCISE

SAMPLE QUESTIONS

1. Reserve Components Callup
 - a. Which major units have reported to mobilizations stations?
 - b. What is the equipment status of these units?
 - c. What is the manpower status (manning, individual training level, etc.)?
 - d. What is the training status of the units (e.g., squad, platoon, company level, etc.)?
 - e. Have people from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) been identified to fill reserve units to full wartime strength with appropriate mix of skills?
 - f. Does the Army information system concerning the status of reserve units and the IRR contain adequate information to answer these questions?
2. POMCUS
 - a. What is the status of POMCUS?
 - b. If there are shortfalls, what is being done to meet the requirements?
 - c. How long will it take to get POMCUS to the combat units?
 - d. The Army 2+10 package of deployments is now falling in on the POMCUS stocks. As an example of determining the real readiness of the equipment in the POMCUS, what has been found out about the availability of tanks? That is, how many tanks were available against the basic POMCUS requirement?
 - e. Of those tanks available, how many are operational, how many are down for maintenance and how many are down for lack of spare parts?
 - f. Has CINCUSAREUR attempted to use any of the POMCUS stocks as reserves for tanks lost in combat (i.e., as war reserves)?
3. POL and Ammunition
 - a. What is the status of ammunition?
 - b. If there are shortfalls, what is being done to meet the requirements?
 - c. What are the difficulties associated with getting POL and ammunition to the combat units?
4. Host Nation Support
 - a. What is the status of arrangements with the German Government (and other governments) for host nation support?
 - b. What are the functions to be performed (e.g., transportation, construction, ammunition handling) and who will accomplish them?
 - c. Can host nation civilians be ordered to perform these functions?
5. Presidential and SecDef Authorities
 - a. What additional authorities does the declaration of a national emergency give the President and the Secretary of Defense?

6. Airlift
 - a. How can we get more airlift beyond the capabilities provided by activation of CRAF III?
 - b. What is the impact on the economy of mobilizing these additional resources?
 - c. What authorities does the Executive Branch have to get these additional resources?
7. Evacuation of Noncombatants
 - a. What is the state of preparation for the evacuation of non-combatants?
 - b. What Federal agency is responsible for supporting the nearly one million noncombatants (dependents, tourists, etc.) who could arrive at U.S. ports?
8. Reserve Callup
 - a. Now that the Service allocation has been determined, what is the allocation in the Army between combat and support units and what is the rationale for this allocation?
 - b. What is the allocation by State?
9. Status of the Military Services
 - a. What is our ability to equip and sustain the force? For example, will it be necessary to draw down on other reserve units in order to equip the 50K?
 - b. What is the status of induction, reception, and processing for further people beyond the 50K callup?
 - c. How are induction, training and classification going to be carried out? Can the Army increase their readiness and deploy while at the same time handling major induction efforts?
 - d. What are future plans?
 - e. What is the status of the overall force (all Services) in terms of equipment, spares, combat consumables, depot support, etc?
10. Status of Army Air Defense in Europe
 - a. What is the status of air defense in Europe and what actions have been taken to beef it up? Address specifically spare parts, technical personnel, missile stocks, etc.
11. Availability of Medical Personnel, Supplies, and Facilities
 - a. What is being done to obtain a current inventory of supplies and facilities?
 - b. What is being done to obtain a current inventory of doctors and other medical personnel?
 - c. What are the requirements for medical personnel, supplies and facilities?
 - d. What is the likely impact on the civilian sector of removing these medical personnel (particularly doctors)?
12. Supplemental Funding
 - a. In view of recent Presidential and SecDef decisions, what is being done concerning a supplemental funding request?

13. War Projection
 - a. What is the current status and reasonable capabilities to produce critical weapons and supplies (i.e., ships, tanks, guns, ammunition, etc.)?
 - b. Who is in charge in this area and how are they exercising their responsibilities?
 - c. There are apparently long delays in getting answers from FPA concerning the status of industrial capability (critical skills, critical war materials, special machinery needs and other items). Who in OSD or the JCS is following this and what can DoD do to fill this gap in information?
14. Selective Service
 - a. What progress has been achieved in building the infrastructure of the Selective Service System (SSS)?
 - b. Who in OSD and the Services is interfacing with SSS?
 - c. What help has been offered to the SSS? (Past experience has shown that DoD needs to augment, at least informally, the technical and management capabilities at the headquarters level.)
 - d. Does the DoD have knowledge of the backup plan of Selective Service in the event their major computer is knocked out?
15. Legal Authorities
 - a. Does the General Counsel or anyone else in OSD understand the authorities granted under the Defense Resources Act passed today by the Congress and signed into law by the President?
 - b. Have these authorities been summarized and promulgated to key decision-makers within the Department of Defense?
 - c. What specific actions have been taken or should be taken by the Secretary of Defense or his designees to capitalize on the new authorities granted by Congress?
16. Civilian Mobilization Assets
 - a. There will be competition for skilled and unskilled manpower resources in the civilian economy as a result of the mobilization needs of the federal civilian work force and the military. What criteria will be used by the Department of Defense, the Civil Service Commission or its successor, and the Selective System to determine who goes where?
17. OSD Level Actions
 - a. What questions concerning industrial mobilization; e.g., activation of munitions production, have been handled by the logistics offices within (OSD) MRA&L?
 - b. What issues bearing on forced deployments, force mix, total resource requirements, and resource allocations have been addressed by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation?
 - c. What OSD offices have participated in the preparation of supplemental funding requests to the Congress (e.g., Comptroller, LA, PAE)?

18. Information System Requirements of the Service Secretariats

- a. To what extent have the assistant secretaries for the various functional areas within the service secretariats been hampered by a lack of information in following areas:
 1. Manpower mobilization (military and civilian)
 2. Industrial mobilization
 3. Trends in improving readiness for active units at less than C-1 at the beginning of mobilization, and mobilizing reserve units?

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Exercise Nifty Nugget 78 was conducted in order to assess national capabilities to mobilize and deploy forces in time of crisis. This evaluation plan, directed primarily at the OASD(MRA&L) role, uses hypothesis testing techniques. Outlines of two sample issues, Transportation Mobilization and Active and Reserve Unit Manpower, to be examined during exercise play are included. A set of sample questions to be asked during exercise play and the subsequent evaluation are presented. ✓		